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THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

The object of this paper is to define the role of a Public Affairs Officer assigned to a CONUS based division deployed to a theater operations for combat.

The paper is organized as follows: an Introduction stating the object of the paper and the organization, a list and discussion of the assumptions made in the paper, a review of the existing literature on the subject of PAO roles and duties, a discussion of each of those roles, and a conclusion. The conclusion not only outlines what the role of a CONUS based division PAO ought to be when assigned to a combat theater, but also contains some recommendations on how to train and prepare for that role.

ASSUMPTIONS

There are two assumptions made to bring the object of this paper into focus.

It is assumed that the division will be part of a larger force, a corps or perhaps an army, assigned to a theater of operations. Therefore, there will be several layers of public affairs personnel above the division PAO. At a minimum there will be a corps PAO, and a land component as well as theater level public affairs organizations. These organizations will conduct many PAO functions: accreditation of reporters, the formation of press pools, the formation of a Public Affairs plan or annex to OPLAN, and the operation of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB), the operation of a Press Camp Headquarters (PCH) and a News Media Center (NMC). Higher echelon public affairs organizations will also conduct briefings for

civilian news media, and act as a liaison between the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs and the deployed unit PAO.

Another assumption made is that the theater of operation is in or an area with a government friendly to the United States. This assumption serves to control US and foreign media access to the theater via the normal immigration-customs-passport-visa procedures. In addition, host nation government support also implies that local host nation media will deal with host nation government personnel.

These assumptions then limit the scope of public affairs duties. Media flow and access will be limited to and somewhat controlled via corps and higher echelon organizations. Press accreditation, press pool formation, and press censorship will be done by someone above division level. Host nation government and US government actions also will be coordinated and planned above the division level.

EXISTING LITERATURE

These two assumptions would seem to so narrow the focus of this paper as to make the role of a division PAO in a combat theater an easy matter to define. Such is not the case. A review of the existing literature proves this.

The existing literature on Public Affairs operations is limited to two Field Manuals FM 46-1, Public Affairs; and FM 101-5, Staff Organization and

Operations. In addition there are four Army Regulations which deal with public affairs issues: AR 360-5, Public Information (PI); AR 360-7, Army Broadcast Service (ABS); AR 360-61 Community Relations (CR); and AR 360-81, Command Information (CI). There are also an Army Public Affairs Professional Development Guidebook, a Public Affairs Handbook published by the Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin Harrison Indiana, and three Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) which deal with public affairs units. The professional Development Guidebook notes the skills required of a PAO at each grade, but not the duties required. Wartime operations are not discussed. The handbook is too generic to be of any value. The TOEs explain, in general terms, the activities of Public Affairs units. Only one of the TOEs, TOE45500LA00 discusses the Public Affairs

organization to be assigned to a division.¹ Of the above, only the ARs on Public Information and Command Information discuss operations in a combat theater

Only FM 46-1 discusses wartime operations.²

Under the heading of wartime operations, FM 46-1 lists the following activities for a PAO: accredit media, inform the commander of PA guidance from higher headquarters, provide staff input on plans and operations, formulate and issue PA policy, conduct command information programs, conduct public information programs, and support visiting media with mess, billets, and communications assets. The total output for wartime operations for PAOs at all

levels is contained on less than two pages³ Accrediting media and formulating policy have been ruled out as tasks for a division PAO by the assumptions Informing the commander on policy from higher headquarters and providing staff input are normal staff officer duties. This leaves only command information and public information as tasks to accomplish. Messing, billeting, and moving the press about is a normal (implied) PI related task.

FM 101-5 reiterates the FM 46-1 guidance with one addition. FM 101-5 also requires the PAO to coordinate with the ACofS, G-5, Civil Military Affairs Officer (CMO) for community relations (CR) activities in-country.⁴

The regulations which cover command information and public information list specific "dos and don'ts". The public information regulation is very detailed with respect to photographic subject matter. Current operations in the command information regulation are wrapped up neatly in one paragraph which notes that, "command information is of greater importance in combat" and the commanders should inform personnel of the "mission, tasks, situation and important personnel policies" as well as passing information on the enemy equipment, uniforms, weapons etc.⁵

Community relations as a role receives mixed guidance. FM 101-5 states that the PAO and CMO must coordinate activities and plans to insure that,

"community relations activities support the command mission."⁶ TOE 45500LA00 clarifies who is running the in-country community relations effort by noting that the Public Affairs Team (PAT) can, "provide support to the G-5 in the development and implementation of civil affairs community relations plans."⁷

In summary, the division Public Affairs Officer for a CONUS based division deployed to a combat theater of operations has very little guidance as to what his role is. From the FMs and ARs available it is plain that the PAO is to conduct public information, and command information activities, and support the community relations efforts of the CMO.

How these programs are to be conducted, what the goals and objectives are and which is to take precedence over the others, however, remains undetermined. Without the answers to these questions the role of the PAO is not well defined. To define the role clearly it is necessary to look at each of the major areas of responsibility command information, public information, and community relations, in some depth.

COMMAND INFORMATION

One way to understand both command information and public information is to examine the audiences these programs apply to. The Army recognizes two major categories of audiences. The first category is the internal audience. The second audience is the external audience. The difference between these two audiences is

the affiliation of the audience to the Army. An internal audience has a tangible link to the Army. The internal audiences recognized in AR 360-81 are: soldiers in both the Active and Reserve Components, the spouses and family members of those soldiers (dependents), USMA and ROTC cadets, military retirees, and Department of the Army civilians workers (DACs).⁸ External audiences are less well defined but usually fall into three groups: the press, members of government, and the general public. A discussion of general publics will follow much later, at present the concern is with the internal audiences. Internal audiences get facts from the Army via the Command Information Program.

As previously noted, the conduct of command information activities by Army personnel is covered in three Army publications: Army Regulation 360-81, Command Information; Field Manual 46-1, Public Affairs; and the Public Affairs Handbook published by the Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin Harrison. Each of these documents clearly assigns command information a high priority in the duties of a Public Affairs Officer. All three documents espouse a common purpose for the Command Information Program. Command information is vital to the Army since well informed soldiers perform better, have higher morale, and better fighting spirit than uninformed soldiers.⁹

A noted civilian author and public relations practitioner, Lawrence W. Nolte, in his work on public relations cites several reasons for conducting a thorough

internal public relations and information effort among workers of business organizations. Civilian "command information" programs are conducted to, "... improve loyalty, improve cooperation between divisions, promote understanding, develop a sense of belonging, explain policies and rules, build confidence in management, promote safety concerns and issues, combat rumors and build pride in the organization."¹⁰ All of these reasons stated by Nolte are equally applicable to the Army Command Information program as the stress and environment that soldiers will have to function in during combat will certainly demand that they are loyal to each other, that they cooperate, and that they understand the role that each must play to assure a battlefield victory. Soldiers will surely need to sense that they are part of a team, and that they belong to that team. They will need confidence in their leaders and pride in their organizations. When armed with the facts they will have the wherewithal to combat the stress of the unknown and avoid the emotional drain that constantly circulating, conflicting, and discouraging rumors, so frequent in combat, cause.

The concept that an informed soldier is a better soldier is one of two Command Information principles stated in AR 360-81. This second principle holds that a well informed soldier is much better equipped to tell the Army story.¹¹ This second principle is much less supported in either Army or civilian literature. Yet this principle is key, and may even be more important than the

first principle. For it is this second principle that allows the Army to use soldiers to explain to the public what is happening on the battlefield. The soldier as spokesman is key to the Army effort to generate favorable public opinion. The only spokesman the Army can afford to have is an informed one. This then is a reason for a command information effort at the division level. But those deployed soldiers aren't the only people who have a need for information.

The internal audiences left behind, family members and dependents, military retirees, and DACs are as much in need of Command Information as those soldiers deployed to a combat zone. Perhaps they are even more in need than those who are deployed. The reasons for this are found in the earlier explanation of command information by Nolte. These groups need accurate timely information to dispel rumors, to sustain their confidence in management, to develop a sense of loyalty to the Army, and all the other actions discussed earlier. Most important is the idea that these internal audiences just as the soldier need to be informed of command policies, rules, and reasons for actions. These audiences are as likely as those deployed to be in contact with media personnel who are asking questions, and demanding answers. Without some information on which to base their opinions and frame their answers these audiences will only suffer more stress. With solid command information they too will be able to accurately, and completely tell the Army story.

These non-deployed groups, however, are bereft of the first hand

information available, in part, to each deployed soldier. For information, these groups must rely on some other source or sources to explain what the soldiers are doing, what the country is like, or why the deployment is underway.

These non-deployed audiences get information from the deployed soldiers via personal mail, they get information from the civilian news media, and they get information through unofficial military channels. As with all information flow, however, the news is not complete, nor totally accurate, nor comprehensive, because none of these sources mentioned has the benefit of a total view of the situation, especially a view from the commander's perspective. The deployed PAO, however, is in a unique position. He is on-site to observe unit activities firsthand. He or she is far enough removed from the action to see the activity in total, and to have access to the commander to obtain his perspective. It falls then on the unit PAO to provide the official (command) information to the non-deployed audiences.

The Public Affairs organization on almost every post with deployable active duty personnel has within the public affairs structure a number of DACs with a public affairs specialty. These are the people through whom the deployed PAO will pass information. It is also the installation PAO who will provide the division PAO with the information on the activities of the non-deployed internal audiences, primarily spouses and dependents, that can be used in the command information effort in theater.

Command information is vital to every internal audience, and for this reason

the PAO must establish a viable command information program that keeps all the internal audiences informed.

How these audiences are informed is also a PAO concern. There are several channels via which information can be passed. Information can be passed through the chain of command, or through various media which the PAO has access to: military newspapers, both the kind usually found on military installations, and field newspapers produced by deployed Public Affairs Teams (PATs); broadcasts in-country via the Army Broadcast Service (ABS) and the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS); via TV spots made in-country by the PAO or AFRTS or a local PAT and then broadcast over post channels in stateside locations, or, lastly, through briefings and displays developed and set up by the chain of command or public affairs infrastructure.

Of all the methods of disseminating information, by far one of the most effective is through the chain of command. Command information is, after all, a commanders' program. Commanders who take the time to carefully articulate the mission to and through the chain of command are practicing command information in the most complete sense.

This careful articulation of the mission by the commander can be amplified by the PAO via the command information channels noted earlier. Every major post in the United States, and every deployed unit overseas, has a military controlled newspaper for the purpose of providing command information. These papers are

vital in getting the word out to the non-deployed publics. In addition, most of these papers can then find their way into the combat theater to act as a command information vehicle for the deployed troops. Such is the case in the deployment to Saudi Arabia. Each of the divisions which deployed from a CONUS base received local base newspapers in bulk via the mail system.¹² Each of these deployed divisions also took with them their CAPSTONE aligned Public Affair Team or PAT. PATs have the organization and mission to produce field newspapers for those soldiers deployed to a combat zone, and several units in Saudi Arabia have begun to do just that.¹³ PATs also, have the capability to produce radio spots to be used via Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS). AFRTS can set up a transmitter in the combat theater to provide soldiers with command information as well as some entertainment, but the main mission of AFRTS is command information.¹⁴ In Saudi Arabia, AFRTS has set up a transmitter which broadcasts not only news from within theater, but also spots produced in CONUS posts, camps, and stations for soldiers deployed overseas.¹⁵ PATs can also produce TV spots for use by the closed circuit TV channel now available, via cable TV contracting, on most stateside posts, camps, and stations. An AFRTS rule of thumb provided by one of the first public affairs officers deployed to Saudi Arabia is that, "Radio is for the troops and TV is for the families".¹⁶

Lastly, the PAO, as well as his installation assistant in CONUS, can provide briefings and displays as a vehicle for command information. Photo boards, maps, and other display items set up in common areas in-theater, and in PXs and Commissaries or Family Support Centers in CONUS, are also valuable tools for passing command information.

To this point the discussion has centered on command information as though everyone knows what command information is. Such may not be the case. Command information is information of value to the troops and other audiences. Command information is also more than newspapers, radio and TV spots, and display boards in the PX. All of these items are simply the channels through which information will flow. The question is what information is to be put through these channels to tell the Army story.

The content of Army newspapers, or radio and TV spots, is described in AR 360-81. According to AR 360-81, "surveys show that soldiers and their families are interested in pay and benefits, training, education opportunities, new equipment, weapons, vehicles, Army policy and programs, military justice, medical and health, sports and physical fitness, and family matters and travel".¹⁷ Commanders are also to give coverage to topics such as the history of the area, unit mission, national policy, troop relations with the media, standards of conduct, the laws of land warfare.¹⁸ FM 46-1 notes that it is important that

Army media provide "recognition of soldier's accomplishments, as well as information on the significance of the overseas theater".¹⁹

It would seem that these various themes collapse into three general groups. These groups are news, human interest, and editorials. The first group are stories with general facts, news in the most rigorous sense, the who, what, why, where, and when of events in and out of theater that are of concern to soldiers. Sports as well as hard news seems to fall into this category. In addition, the news does not have to be of importance outside that narrow audience of the unit for which the paper or radio spot was made. Post, camp and station news is important.

Another group of stories has a focus on those things that highlight a soldier or group of soldiers. A noted historian and student of human behavior and communication during war, Paul Fussell, once called these stories "Joe Blow" stories. He called them Joe Blow stories not to denigrate their importance but to show the commonality of the theme.²⁰ These stories cover soldiers in their work or living habitat. That story line lends depth and perspective to those news stories that simply list achievements. These are the stories that put faces on the soldiers who win and fight battles. They help the soldier articulate what it is he or she does, and how he or she does it. The story may well recognize how well the task was performed. The story can come from the battlefield or the home installation. The latter could highlight the effort spent to support deployed

troops, or show the sacrifices made on the home front to provide for those in battle. Human interest stories from either area can be used in both areas.

The last group of command information articles, editorials, seems to be the essence of command information and yet these are the articles to be treated the most cautiously. Public affairs work is not propaganda. The Nazis used propaganda units to disseminate information within the German Army during World War II with disastrous results. Soldiers soon came to regard all information provided as suspect.²¹ The information in this last group covers the why-we-are-there-doing-what-we-are-doing aspect of command information. Because of the intensely emotional and volatile nature of this type of information, this information would be best put through the chain of command face to face, person to person, where the exchange could be two-way.

Nonetheless, other channels are open and when the comments are tailored properly and chosen wisely, the use of command information media would appear to be effective. The efficiency of this channel is that it does not suffer from interpretation. The commander's corner of a newspaper or commander's radio spot allows the commander to talk directly to each soldier in exactly the words he wants to use and in the way he wants them used.

This last concept of control of the message was brought out by two noted public relations practitioners, Cutlip and Center, in their book on public relations. They recognized that the value of an internal communication program (command

Information) is that the leadership of an organization can through internal media, "... go on record for their own purpose, in their own words, in their own way, without interruption or intervention".²²

Command Information then, is the Army way to talk to Army audiences. It is a way to do some team building, to set goals, to encourage participation, to show caring, and to encourage command participation. Command Information is a way for the commander to talk to his troops without interference, without editing from the press, without sound bites, without editing for quotes out of context. It is also a way for the commander to talk to the American public at large and other external audiences. He can do so through the actions and comments of his troops.

The division-level Public Affairs Officer is clearly the linchpin in the command information effort. If the Army is to follow the stated public affairs axiom to "speak with one voice", if teams are to be built, rumors combated, soldiers and achievements recognized, and if the story is to be told without modification by outside agencies, then it is the division PAO who is to be sure that the effort is ongoing, continuous, and complete.

This may not work in the real world. Command Information is only one of the three stated PAO tasks. Division level PAOs still must deal with public information requirements, and a CMO run community relations effort. Since the more complex of these two is public information, let us quickly deal with community relations.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Earlier it was noted that FM 101-5 also assigned the mission of community relations to the PAO. While FM 101-5 did not stipulate this as a wartime mission, the TOE for a Public Affairs Team did indicate that community relations in a combat theater was a CMO mission to be achieved through PAO support.

Information on this is scarce. It would seem logical that PAO support of community relations actions in-theater is really good command information. Community relations with the local populace are the mission of the CMO. What does the PAO do? The PAO role is to provide the soldiers the facts that will make them acceptable to the local populace: information on local customs, traditions, history, laws, and the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Putting this information out to soldiers is nothing more than command information.

Community relations on the home front should go on as before, with the installation PAO in charge. The in-theater PAO can assist by providing photos and scripts for briefings, and if possible identifying returning personnel for potential speech assignments via the Speakers Bureau.

Even though command information both in and out of theater seem to dovetail nicely with community relations, the whole effort may still not work. The division PAO must still deal with the requirements of the Army public information program.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

The roles, responsibilities, and reasons for an Army Public Information program are found in the same doctrinal publications as those for the Army command information program. Army Regulation 360-5, Public Information, provides some specific guidance for PAOs, commanders, and soldiers on the conduct of public information activities.

This detailed guidance provided on the conduct of public information programs is aimed primarily toward the press. The press is the target as it is the predominant organ for the formulation of public opinion. "In a country of 240 million people the primary means of conveying national security issues to the public must fall to the media. The ability to sustain the confidence of the American people in military operations for better or worse relies on ...

journalists."²³ Public opinion has a powerful impact on the military. A crude but significant measure of the importance of public opinion is found in the Army War College text, Army Command and Leadership Theory and Practice. This keystone text for senior Army leaders devotes to the topic of public opinion and the effect public opinion has on the Army, fully twice as much discussion as is spent on any other issue and three times the amount of text devoted to the impact of Congress on the Army.²⁴

General Westmoreland recognized the impact of public opinion on military operations and plainly stated that wars could not be won nor sustained without positive public opinion.²⁵

Public confidence in the military leadership conducting the war will be formed in large measure through the public understanding of the issues over which the war is fought, and the conduct of the war itself. The issue of why a war must be fought will be derived primarily from the civilian sources at the highest levels of the government. Understanding how the war will be fought will no doubt come from the public impression of the conduct of the war as seen through the eyes of the press. "Sustaining the will of the people," Yaeger observed, "will depend upon what they see and hear from the fighting through ... war correspondents."²⁶

The general public is not the only group of people to be influenced by what the press will show of the war. Congress, too, will be affected by not only what the press reports about the war, but also what the press reports about the effect of the war on the general public, and the reaction of the general public to the war. However as LTG Sidle observed, "The real impact on the public and also I might add on the Congress and the administration, is what comes out in the media".²⁷

The media, the Congress and the administration, and the general public then are the three general audiences that the public information program is designed to support. But, since the media are the conduit to the other two audiences, the press

is the most important of the three.

To understand the press as a public, it is necessary to examine the press in detail. The press is far from perfect, it is largely ignorant of military affairs, has an adversarial bias toward the military, can be guilty of pack journalism, and may deliberately subvert the efforts of the Public Affairs community if it is allowed to, or if the military-media relationship is not managed with care.

That the press is largely ignorant of military affairs has been documented in several works. Donald Zoll observed that journalists have a, "... general inability to evaluate military performance in a sophisticated fashion."²⁸ Even those correspondents who follow military affairs rather closely, "stressed the complexity of reporting defense news," and noted that reporting on defense issues, "... requires constant effort to remain abreast of military subjects."²⁹ Robert Elegant in his work on how the press "lost the war in Vietnam" noted that most journalists, "knew little about war in general from either experience or study."³⁰ Nor have these rather dated observations spurred any real interest in the press toward improvement. Fred Reed, a noted syndicated columnist, noted in a recent Army Times article that most military reporters did not know what they were talking about and weren't doing much to improve their knowledge of military subjects.³¹

The press may, however, reject any positive or informed input. They may reject objectivity to conform to a predetermined editorial bias. Ultimately reporters may begin to write stories that conform to the views of their fellow reporters rather than the facts. This is known as pack journalism.³²

The press holds that it must maintain an adversarial relationship with the government and the Army. "I'm not," said Wall Street Journal editor Richard Levine, "a member of their team. They don't understand the adversary relationship that does and should exist."³³ This adversarial relationship has generated considerable friction between the officer corps of the Army and the press. Retired USMC Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, who once covered military issues for the New York Times, believes that the officer corps has a "loathing for the press".³⁴

Trainor claims that many in the military seem to subscribe to the idea that the press lost the Vietnam war. Nor are some in the military alone in blaming the press for losing the Vietnam war. Robert Elegant, a British journalist, alleges that the press was instrumental in the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. He cites pack journalism and an anti-government bent by most of the reporters covering the war as two of the reasons that most stories filed by independent journalists in Vietnam portrayed the situation there as desperate and

beyond the control of the US military.³⁵ Slightly less accusatory views of the military-press relationship both then and now have been offered by many military writers. An ex-Navy PAO, Commander Ralph Blanchard, offers the observations that: reporters are guilty of not being team players and cooperating with voluntary constraints to the news; of "position reporting" i.e. adopting a negative stance and reporting from that viewpoint; of "crises reporting", reporting the sensational or the mundane in a sensational manner; of "uninformed reporting"; and of poor reporting due to "factual errors".³⁶

Military-press relationships may not have truly improved since Vietnam. The press coverage of the Grenada invasion was restricted until after the battle was completely over. The military commander on the scene claimed that he kept the press out for their safety.³⁷ The media saw their exclusion as a plot to hide the military operation from press coverage. When the press expressed their outrage at this treatment, much of their complaining fell on what appeared to be the deaf ears of a public grown tired of press carping and excesses.³⁸ The situation did not improve much in Panama when the pool formed to cover the invasion was sequestered on Davis Air Force Base while the bulk of the operation was conducted.³⁹ The situation in Saudi Arabia has drawn comments and criticism from the press. Censorship and restraints have been imposed and often

the military answer has been "I can't talk about operational matters". The public view of the press exclusion has not been outrage.⁴⁰

The press has already served notice that they will not abide by restrictions and restraints. Speaking in public forum newsman Robert Pisor said, "If you make a hard fast rule that nobody works this [combat] zone without some escort listening and leading, you'll make enemies and you'll very quickly find reporters working around you."⁴¹ Nor is this an isolated or outdated viewpoint, "With or without accreditation and issue flak jackets," said Malcome Browne, "civilian correspondents will be on the battlefields by mule or shank's mare if necessary."⁴² As if to prove the point, a recent article in TIME magazine claims that, "A growing number of journalists are already circumventing military restrictions" [in Saudi Arabia] and "pool busting". Journalists are going outside the approved press pool to find stories in Saudi Arabia.⁴³

The military policy is to let the press on the battlefield and let them cover the story. The current press pool arrangements in Saudi Arabia seem to reflect this. It is a clear case of, "If you can't lick'em join'em". The policy as stated in the Command and Leadership text is abundantly clear, "If we don't talk to the press someone else will and that someone may not understand the government position or may have an axe to grind".⁴⁴ Even if axe grinding is done by the

press, the point is still moot. Phil Goulding, whose credentials include work as a PAO for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, work as a correspondent for Associated Press, and reporter for the Cleveland Plain Dealer, summed up the situation when he said, "Cry-babying about the press is not the solution even when it [the press] is sloppy and irresponsible. The government is not going to change the press and shouldn't try".⁴⁵

Eventually the argument boils down to the logic that reporters are going to seek out stories in any and every way possible, with or without government assistance and approval. Therefore the source of those stories must be as informed and as knowledgeable as possible. What every PAO should try to avoid is the situation that apparently existed in Vietnam. The results of a ABC News-Washington Post poll indicated that 64% of the those who fought in Vietnam between August of 1964 and June of 1975 were unclear as to what the war was about.⁴⁶ The circumstances, a hostile press and uninformed soldiers, can only lead to stories that reflect poorly on the Army.

COMMAND INFORMATION versus PUBLIC INFORMATION

The role of the divisional PAO deployed to the combat theater is to conduct both public and command information efforts. While this seems easy to do, the pressure to respond to media demands may be too great. The division PAO may believe himself to be forced into conducting public information activities. This

may occur even though the Theater and Corps PAOs restrict media flow to the front line units and disperse the media evenly throughout the theater. (Thus lessening the pressure on any individual PAO or one group of PAOs.)

A worthwhile public information effort depends on informed soldiers. Nothing could be worse than neglecting the command information effort. Information on the current operation, the home front, and every possible facet of concern to soldiers must be in some way addressed. Again the only way to do this is to insure that the command information effort has highest priority while allowing the press access to soldiers.

Using soldiers to tell the story to the press is easily the best way for the Army to tell the Army story. The press is naturally suspect of the Public Affairs Officer and several political cartoonists have used "Information Officers" as the topic for satire.⁴⁷ In Minimum Disclosure, a study of the press-Pentagon working relationship Jeurgan Helse, the author, notes that the press often holds the opinion that the Public Information Officers are poor representations of the military and little better than flacks, even to the point where the Army itself puts little store in their effort.⁴⁸ If the press sees the PAO as a flack, then the PAO starts at a disadvantage which he may not ever overcome. The PAO who is viewed as a flack by the press taints the information he passes.

Journalists appear to attach much more credence to information gathered

first hand from the source i.e. soldier than from another collection agency i.e. the public affairs community. This same feeling may even apply to the news provided via the pool system. It is obvious that the media regards soldiers as the best sources of information. "Ask a journalist for his opinion of servicemen after his first reporting assignment on the military," General Trainor observes, "the journalist will lavishly praise the enlisted personnel he met and relate how enthusiastic they were. He will remark on how well they know their jobs. He'll note how proud they were of what they were doing, and how eager they were to explain their duties".⁴⁹ The motivated soldier as a media source for public information is clearly a vote to place command information programs high upon the list of PAO duties. This becomes much clearer when the soldiers are shown on television. Television allows the public to form an opinion first hand from observation of the scene. Listening to the people who are directly involved in the action circumvents, to an extent, the reporter. It removes the reporter from the traditional role of interpreter and conveyor (reporter) of facts. TV is a direct link between the news topic and the audience. The potential for the Army to take the story directly to the audience is enhanced by TV. The need for a reporter to "report" is nullified by the medium of TV. What is shown on TV, is of course subject to editing, but the opportunity to send a message directly to the public is certainly there.

The use of soldiers and leaders as spokesmen for the Army again hinges on

the idea that everyone with whom the press will have contact has heard and understands what the command goals are, and understands the reason for the deployment and what they are doing. Getting the word out is obviously a command information function. Public information channels however compete with the Army command information channels to get the word out.

During the invasion of Panama the press was so attentive to government actions that it sensed the invasion as the operation was unfolding. With the tremendous global reach of the press both in placement of reporters and ability to transmit news, the invasion was covered almost from the moment it began. While it is true that pool reporters were confined to Davis Air Force Base in Panama, there were so many other reporters covering so many other facets of the operation that the story was told in rapid fashion. This immediate and international coverage prompted many in the Army to offer the opinion that public information was the same as command information. These commanders believe that the word got to soldiers quicker through public information channels than through command information channels. In an unpublished report to the Chief of Public Affairs by the Chief of the Public Affairs Propensity Office, who conducted extensive interviews with soldiers who served in the Panama operation, the observation was made that command information and public information were the same thing.⁵⁰

Commanders claimed public information and command information were the same thing because anything released to the media went immediately on to the

airwaves and was subsequently picked up by American soldiers who were monitoring the news on their private radios. (There was even an instance of an infantry unit which used a television supplied by the local Panamanian populace to watch CNN.⁵¹) The press also played a vital role in keeping the installation public informed, but the installation PAOs and chain of command also told the Army story.

The question that arises from this then is, even if command information is first priority, should we use public information channels to disseminate it? Again the answer is no, command information and public information are two distinct operations aimed at two different audiences. Moreover, the press, as noted earlier, has no obligation to faithfully reproduce everything a commander may want passed along to his troops and other audiences. The reason that a command information program exists is to allow the commander to pass information along to his troops in his own words, in his own way, at his own time. It is necessary to remember that as the previous Chief of Public Affairs for the Army, MG Patrick Brady, has observed, "command information is best disseminated through Army media".⁵² The authors of the OCPA report also arrived at the same conclusion and stated as a supporting rationale, "... when we rely on the civilian media for internal audience communication, our audiences see it as the civilian media doing a better job of communication than the Army".⁵³

If the Army were to allow the media exclusively, or even initially, to present command information issues, the Army would be turning over command, in a sense, to the media.

Aside from the obvious fact that the media would probably not pass on all the command information that the Army released, the equally obvious point is that uneducated or unscrupulous reporters could through the process of editing or story structuring write the story in such a way as to totally overturn or reverse the information that the Army wished to release.

News released to Army publics may not be that which the command would necessarily want released to or through the public media. This is not to say that the media would not follow up on news released to families, but the initial release should be at the discretion of the Army, and in the words chosen by the PAO or commander.

The obvious answer, then, is that the public information channels have to be used to compliment the command information channels. News and information have to go to the soldiers and especially the installation audiences via command channels as rapidly as is possible, and ahead, if possible, of any release to the media for public information. Again, this means that command information has to be the primary task of the PAO. The Army audiences should be well enough advised that they look first to command information sources for the answers to their questions and concerns and that they look to command information channels to

confirm what they get from other sources, especially the media.

CONCLUSIONS

It is obvious that the role of the Public Affairs Officer in a regional conflict is to use every facility at his disposal to promulgate the command information system, support the media and the public information process, and assist the CMO efforts toward community relations. The command information system should be his first priority.

Also, the command information system includes not just those soldiers deployed to the theater of operations but it includes all the installation publics: family members (spouses and dependents), DACs, retirees, and even ROTC and USMA cadets.

How the PAO keeps the command information effort going in the face of the demands of the public information system and community relations requirements is the subject of the last part of this paper.

MAKING IT WORK: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

To make the command information system work, both the commander and the PAO must work together to put the theory into practice. While the PAO must be

heavily involved in execution, it is the commander who must, as always, get the project started. In this next section, three recommendations on how the command information program can be practiced and exercised in peacetime, as preparation and a model for wartime operations, will be presented. The recommendations are one: That the commander include the PAO in the planning of operational events to take place within the command. Two, that the commander make use of all his public affairs assets when conducting operations, either in peacetime or in combat. Three, that the commander exercise his public affairs assets in much the same way as he exercises (trains) his other troops in preparation for combat.

It would seem to go without saying that a commander should incorporate his PAO in the early planning of any operation. With some exceptions this has just not been the case. The results of the public affairs effort (both command information and Public Information) have been predictably poor. During the invasion of Grenada, "public Affairs Officers were not consulted and... there was no public affairs annex in the operations order".⁵⁴ During the invasion of Panama, much the same occurred. In one instance a divisional PAO had some time to plan. In the case of another division the PAO was told the night before that the invasion was going to take place. That PAO was not even allowed to deploy with the unit until after the invasion had taken place. "Senior leaders are reluctant," the OCPA investigation team concluded, "to draw PAOs into the planning process."⁵⁵

What this smacks of is lack of planning at all on the part of commanders, and it indicates a true lack of understanding on the part of commanders and chiefs of staff of the role of the Public Affairs Officer. It has been documented that in wargaming battle plans PAOs are rarely consulted.⁵⁶ This is even more vexing when the press has served notice that they intend to be on the scene in any future war, and therefore the media are an issue to be considered and dealt with in any future war. Certainly the day-to-day activities of the press would indicate that the press will be present in any conflict. The Army was specifically told in the mid-eighties that the Army should, "...be prepared for open war and plan accordingly, anticipate an even more pervasive media structure".⁵⁷

The recommendation then is to incorporate public affairs officers in every facet of any plan. In this way the PAO can surface command information concerns and needs. The PAO can further plan to handle Public Information demands in a way that does not impede, but rather enhances the command information effort.

This, of course, starts at the top with the senior commander in theater and works downward through each level of command. A good example of this "top-down" permeation of PAO planning can be found in the REFORGER Public Affairs plan which is attached as an appendix to this paper. While the execution noted therein is worthy of emulation, if not outright duplication, the idea is that this plan started early with all the other REFORGER planning, and started at the

top in command channels, and was moved from level to subordinate level as a command imperative.

Inherent in the plan is the consideration of assets. The second recommendation for improvement is that a commander use all the assets available to him when deployed to a combat zone or on a major training exercise. To be sure, the chain of command must be used. However, major training exercises and deployments must involve the use of Public Affairs Teams. Exercises must assume the existence of a Joint Information Bureau and a Press Camp Headquarters. These latter two organizations are truly wartime organizations whose mobilization is only justified by a press demand significantly higher than that usually created during an exercise. During exercises these organizations should, however, be addressed, and during wartime operations their use is imperative. To date operations in Saudi Arabia have involved the use of both of these organizations. As noted earlier, the media have complained about dealing with both of these organizations (although the complaints have been minor). Nonetheless these two organizations managed to control the media swarm produced by the Saudi operation. As a result, media intrusion into the operations of tactical units has been held down.

All of the active divisions which deployed from CONUS did deploy with the assigned PAO, and Public Affairs Teams.⁵⁸ As noted earlier the PATs have the ability to produce field newspapers, radio spots, TV spots for use at the home

station, and of course, photos and copy for use both in-country and at home station in installation newspapers, bulletin boards, and briefings.

As early as December 1990, some of these PATs had begun to produce small field newspapers, but most had elected to send copy and photos back to the installation for publication. The installation newspapers were then forwarded by mail to the deployed units.⁵⁹ This appears to be a truly roundabout way to serve a primary audience. PATs should be producing local field newspapers in each division. If the command information program is to work this key ingredient must be incorporated into the overall effort. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how we can speak with one voice if we are not speaking to each other.

A cursory and less than scientific examination of the papers provided by units deployed in Saudi Arabia revealed that the majority of, if not all, stories were of the Joe Blow variety, while the other messages about what other units had been deployed, the contributions of the reserve components, activities at home station, and the reasons behind the deployment went unsaid. This lack of diversity or balance in the field papers reflects in some ways lack of training by the local PAT and unit PAO.

This leads then to the third recommendation. Unit PAOs and the PAT aligned with the unit via CAPSTONE, or any other contingency planning document, should train together frequently. The rotation of units through the Combined Arms Training Centers (Joint Readiness Training Center, the National Training Center,

or CMTC in Europe) provides an excellent opportunity for PAOs and the PATs to do just that sort of training.

Units deploying to the NTC should deploy both the PAO and a PAT. The PAT could then be required to do everything in this peacetime rotation that is required when troops are committed to combat. While this may seem to be an obvious solution, the NTC reports that just two units have deployed with a PAT for the purpose of producing on a frequent basis a field newspaper.⁶⁰ Most of those units which deploy with a PAO, PAT, or both do so with the intent of producing one paper at the end of the rotation either at home station or at the NTC via commercial printing assets. This is not true command information and probably won't do what is required when the unit is deployed for combat. PATs need to be tasked to provide a field newspaper every other day. PATs must also be required to produce photos, articles, and TV or radio spots for use at home station during the rotation.

The PAO ought to be required to host at least one member of the media, preferably one from the civilian population center close to the unit home base. Better yet would be the requirement for a PAO to host several media members representing both the print and electronic branches of the press. This would replicate the press pool that the PAO would face in a combat theater. The audience for this type of solicitation is wider than just the hometown media. Many newspapers, journals, and magazines target their medium at an audience concerned with military matters and actions. Each of these media is a good

prospect for an invitation to accompany a unit on a Combat Training Center rotation.

The benefits from this type of training are numerous. By inviting local press to a Combat Training Center the press would be educated not only on the local unit within the sphere of influence of that medium, but also on the Army at large, to acquire a gauge for the depth, complexity, and intensity of the training that the Army does. It is a chance to show a local taxpayer where his money goes in the Department of Defense. It is also an inroad into the local media. Local media personnel have complained in the past that the military only wants access for easy and uncontroversial events, e.g., items that are not news. One editor of a local paper near a sizeable military base has gone on record with the comment that he would publish more items on the military if only he were invited to observe more military events.⁶¹

Accompanying a unit on a CTC rotation would also be an excellent way to train members of the media about the military, what it does, how it is organized, and how it will fight. It is a chance for the Army to improve press coverage by educating reporters.

In educating reporters the Army can also begin to educate the upcoming generations of officers on how the press works and what the press point of view is. The only way for officers to understand the press is through contact with them. While the CTC is a difficult environment for that press military contact to

happen, a CTC does replicate the combat situations which will place reporters and soldiers in contact with each other. Press coverage at a CTC will give the next generations of officers an experience base from which they can formulate their concept of the press and how to deal with it.

This type of training also prepares both the PAO and the PAT for the possibility of a contingency type deployment. Roles can be determined and procedures and techniques can be established. The PAT is the element which will have to do much of the command information effort. The PAO will most likely be tied up with media escort duties.

SUMMARY

In this paper the role of the division Public Affairs Officer in a regional conflict has been examined. In the consideration of published Army doctrine, and the accepted principles of the civilian field of Public Relations, the findings of this paper are that: Command Information must always take precedence over public information and that all Army audiences- family members, retirees, DACs, and USMA and ROTC cadets- are as much of the wartime command information effort as are the troops. Therefore the PAO must also continue to serve these publics even though the parent unit has deployed to a combat zone.

Other findings are that PAOs should be incorporated into all plans and worgames; that the PA organization (PAO, PAT, and Installation PAO) should be

exercised on wartime missions whenever the division is deployed to a CTC; that the public information effort will force PAOs to have a viable CI program; and lastly that PI is not CI.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, and SEVENTH ARMY
CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
APO NEW YORK 09403-0113



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AEAPA

22 December 1989

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Plan (REFORGER 90 - Exercise CENTURION SHIELD)

REFERENCE: Annex F to CINCUSAREUR REFORGER 90 EXDIR (4047X) Public Affairs

A. INTRODUCTION.

1. PURPOSE.

a. Provides commanders, staff officers, public affairs officers, and soldiers with the CINC's Public Information (media relations) and Command Information concepts, themes and objectives for REFORGER 90 and Exercise CENTURION SHIELD.

b. Outlines themes in support of U.S. Army Europe's mission as 'Keepers of the Peace.'

c. Outlines specific taskings for unit PAOs in support of USAREUR's 1990 Command Information Plan.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. ALL.

1) Become familiar with the contents of this plan through review, command information briefings, and discussion during professional development sessions.

2) Serving as spokespersons for USAREUR, use the themes and objectives to better explain our mission to the press and, through them, to the American public.

b. Commanders.

1) In concert with unit PAOs, develop implementing plans to ensure widest dissemination of the plans' themes and objectives.

2) Use all available Command Information tools to familiarize soldiers with our themes and objectives.

3) Host visiting media.

c. PAOs.

1) IAW your commander's guidance, develop implementing plans.

2) Utilize all available Command Information tools to communicate themes and goals.

3) Coordinate for and support media visits to your command.

4) IAW guidance in Part C, paragraph 5, plan and produce Command Information products in support of USAREUR's 1990 Command Information Plan.

B. PUBLIC INFORMATION (Media Relations).

1. GENERAL.

a. Communicating the U.S. Army Europe story has always been the major objective of our Public Information Programs at all levels of command. The recent events in Eastern Europe, coupled with domestic pressures to further reduce defense spending, have increased the importance of explaining to the media and through them, to the public, who we are, what we do, and why we do it.

b. REFORGER 90/Exercise Centurion Shield can be expected to draw extensive media coverage. While the media, both U.S. and international, will have questions about exercise specifics, we can also anticipate the full spectrum of questions about our present and future role in Europe.

c. If we expect the media to report accurately, it is our obligation to assist them in gaining a full appreciation for both our exercise objectives and the complexities and challenges of our mission as 'Keepers of the Peace' during these historic times.

d. The themes and objectives outlined below are also applicable to Part C, Command Information.

2. PURPOSE.

a. Outlines Public Information themes and objectives which will provide a framework for our discussions with the media during REFORGER 90/Exercise CENTURION SHIELD.

b. Addresses both our mission in Europe and REFORGER 90/Exercise CENTURION SHIELD.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Commanders.

1) Fully understand our Public Information themes and objectives.

2) Provide command support to unit Public Affairs Officers in disseminating the objectives.

3) Through all available Command Information channels, communicate, discuss, and explain our Public Information objectives to our soldiers.

4) Draw upon them in discussions with visiting members of the media.

5) Ensure each soldier understands and appreciates his/her role as a spokesperson for USAREUR.

b. Public Affairs Officers.

1) Assist the commander in the dissemination of the Public Information themes and objectives through available mediums.

2) As official spokesperson for our unit, fully understand and be prepared to discuss each of our themes when queried by visiting media.

3) Develop activity menus for visiting media which, in addition to meeting their specific needs, focus on our themes and objectives.

c. Soldiers.

1) Understand how our themes and objectives relate to your daily routine as a 'Keeper of the Peace.'

2) Discuss them with your fellow soldiers, your chain of command and your family.

3) Take pride in your role as a spokesperson for the finest military organization our country has ever fielded, U.S. Army Europe, the 'Keepers of the Peace.'

4) Draw upon them when talking to visiting members of the media.

4. EXECUTION.

a. General. This plan incorporates four mutually supporting elements which serve as a framework for our interface with the media prior to and during REFORGER 90. Additionally, all elements support the basic Command Information objective of keeping the soldier informed.

1) Themes supporting USAREUR's mission as 'Keepers of the Peace.'

2) REFORGER 90/CENTURION SHIELD Public Information objectives.

3) Exercise CENTURION SHIELD official Press Release with supporting Questions and Answers.

4) CENTURION SHIELD Exercise Briefing.

b. 'Keepers of the Peace' - The USAREUR Mission for 1990.

1) U.S. Army Europe has adopted the 'Keepers of the Peace' as the phrase to characterize our present and future mission in NATO. CINC USAREUR has set forth general themes which address both our mission and our day-to-day routine in Europe.

2) For CONUS-based units. We are faced with a unique and dynamic situation here in Europe. It is a time of changing perceptions, and we must adapt in order to continue to effectively execute our mission. We consider all of you full members in the USAREUR Team and hope you will find these themes helpful in your Command Information Programs.

a) Theme: Our NATO Mission.

-- Maintain a combat ready force to deter aggression and maintain stability

-- 40 years of peace in Europe is a direct result of our presence, we have been successful

b) Theme: The 'Threat'.

-- Time of changing 'perceptions'

-- Time of unprecedented initiatives by East and West

-- As soldiers, we must deal with reality of Soviet military capabilities

-- Consequently, our basic mission is unchanged: Maintain a trained and ready force for stability and peace

c) Theme: USAREUR's Soldiers.

-- The Best! Members of an all-volunteer force

-- Committed to the preservation of freedom at home and in Western Europe

-- Willing to fight in defense of freedom

d) Theme: The USAREUR Team.

-- Trained, disciplined, and motivated soldiers

-- Professional leaders who care

-- Dedicated and experienced civilians

-- The finest equipment in the world

-- Combat ready units

-- Superb volunteers who care

-- Caring families

e) Theme: Modernization.

-- Our leadership fully supports the need for effective systems

-- Stationing actions are key elements in the program, and

-- are a 'Key' to the credibility of our deterrent posture in the years ahead

f) Theme: Quality of life in USAREUR.

-- Taking care of people is every leader's responsibility

-- We will do all we can to care for soldiers and families serving in USAREUR

-- USAREUR's leadership is committed to:

* sustain essential quality of life programs while maintaining a combat ready force

* making tough decisions and,

* standing accountable to the USAREUR family

g) Theme: Readiness has a price which must be paid.

-- Make every dollar count

-- Train 'smarter'

-- Do not tolerate fraud, waste or abuse

-- Take care of what we have

h) Theme: 'Partners' in NATO and 'Guests' in the host country.

-- We realize our presence impacts on the daily routine of our hosts, therefore we must:

* work and live 'friendly'

* respect the environment

* sustain a dialogue with local officials

* insure our soldiers are well trained so they will operate in safety

* minimize maneuver damage and inconvenience

c. REFORGER 90/ Exercise CENTURION SHIELD Public Information objectives:

1) Objective: Enable the media to fully understand the complexities and challenges of the mission of U.S. Army Europe.

-- It is essential that the press and the public understand that U.S. Army Europe has made a direct contribution to 40 years of peace in Europe and that the continued maintenance of a trained and ready force provides an umbrella which permits stability to prevail in these uncertain times.

2) Objective: Familiarize the media with our 'training smart' concept.

-- It is essential that we communicate what 'training smart' means; that it is a methodology for maintaining our high standards in the most cost effective manner, utilizing the right mix of exercise techniques while maximizing simulation technology - training the right people, at the right time, in the right scenario.

3) Objective: Explain the rationale for USAREUR's training strategy.

-- For the European media, our objective is to clearly articulate the Army-wide training requirements that require us to conduct training where and how we do. For the American media, they need to understand the 'physical or geographic' differences between training a battalion in USAREUR and training that same battalion at Fort Hood or Fort Carson.

****Based on mission essential task list**

****Conducted in local training areas at home station; maneuver rights areas; major training areas; integrates devices, simulations, and instrumentation.**

4) Objective: Explain our exercise objectives.

-- The media traditionally thinks of REFORGER field exercises as large scale maneuvers focusing on brigade and battalion level tactical operations. We must articulate the shift in focus to the training of headquarters; commanders and staffs, the need to get the most from our training dollars, and the requirement to continue to meet our commitment under the REFORGER program.

-- Stress the role of the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) in the conduct of 'tough and realistic' battalion-level training.

5) Objective: Enable the media to observe and visit with our outstanding soldiers.

-- Soldiers are our best and most creditable spokespersons. Provide them the facts they need to talk with the press and then give them the opportunity to do so.

6) Objective: Show the media our superb equipment.

-- The force modernization program of the 1980s has been of historic proportions and has given us the finest equipment in the world. The press need to see it in action and see that our soldiers can handle it with skill and confidence.

7) Objective: Demonstrate to the media our commitment to: safety in training, protection of the environment, and minimizing the inconvenience to our hosts.

-- Many feel we still have the 'occupation' mentality and lack sensitivity to the concerns of our hosts. Our actions must show that we do strive to live and work as friends and that maneuver damage prevention and safety are integral to all our operations.

d. Exercise Press Release (Enclosure 1) (mailed under separate cover).

e. CENTURION SHIELD Exercise Briefing (Enclosure 2) (mailed under separate cover).

C. COMMAND INFORMATION.

1. GENERAL.

a. The objective of Command Information is to communicate within the unit chain of command to improve morale and enhance readiness. An informed soldier is a better soldier. The dedicated, professional volunteers of U.S. Army Europe have consistently shown that they have a tremendous capacity for knowledge, that they want to know, and that in knowing, they consistently perform better.

b. Never has the 'demand' for information been greater than at present. The world is changing, changes unprecedented since the end of World War II. We are not only caught up in the change, we are, in fact, contributors to the very causes of these dramatic changes.

c. While our mission remains unchanged, there is the requirement for commanders to communicate that fact to our soldiers to better enable them to see the necessity for their continued presence and the maintenance of high standards in training.

2. PURPOSE.

a. Provides the necessary information to enable soldiers to understand their role as 'Keepers of the Peace' in a historic time of both promise and instability.

b. Outlines the Commander-in-Chief's basic themes for 1990. These themes address all aspects of our mission and our daily routine in USAREUR, both on and off duty.

c. Provides soldiers the information they need to understand and accomplish their mission during REFORGER 90/Exercise CENTURION SHIELD.

d. Provides soldiers the information they need to serve as USAREUR's spokespersons in direct discussions with members of the visiting media.

e. Provides guidance to Public Affairs Officers for the production of Command Information products in support of USAREUR's 1990 Command Information Program.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Commanders.

1) Disseminate themes and objectives through command information programs such as troop talks, OPD and NCOPD.

2) Coordinate with unit PAOs for specific support requirements.

b. PAOs.

1) Utilize all available command information tools to disseminate themes and objectives.

2) Establish long-term plan for the dissemination of 'Keepers of the Peace' themes.

3) Coordinate for input to Exercise newspaper.

4) Coordinate for the production of special command information products as outlined in paragraph 5, below.

4. EXECUTION.

a. General.

1) The Command Information Plan utilizes the same four components outlined in Part B, Public Information.

2) The ability to effectively communicate with the media is based on an understanding of the themes and objectives.

b. Command Information Themes and Objectives.

- 1) 'Keepers of the Peace' - The USAREUR Mission for 1990. See Part B, 4, b.
- 2) REFORGER 90/Exercise CENTURION SHIELD Public Information Objectives. See Part B, 4, c.
- 3) Exercise CENTURION SHIELD Press Release with supporting Questions and Answers. (Enclosure 1 mailed under separate cover)
- 4) REFORGER 90/Exercise CENTURION SHIELD Exercise Briefing. (Enclosure 2 mailed under separate cover)

c. Special requirements are outlined in paragraph 5, below.

5. Command Information Product Production.

a. General.

- 1) Exercises such as REFORGER offer unique opportunities to compile a wide range of print and audio-visual products for subsequent use in support of the CINC's Command Information Objectives.
- 2) Additionally, many of these products are suitable for export to AFN and the commercial media as they 'tell the USAREUR story.'

b. Concept. Special requirements for CENTURION SHIELD include:

- 1) Production and publication of an Exercise newspaper.
- 2) Utilization of the 'Unit and Soldier of the Day' recognition program. (Reporting procedures will be provided in CI implementing instructions)
- 3) Compilation of video footage of all aspects of the 'right mix' of exercise techniques.
- 4) Soldier interviews on impressions of the 'training smart' concept.
- 5) Conduct of interviews with NCOs on squad/section/crew training techniques.
- 6) Interviews with NCOs on impressions of the Year of the .NCO.

7) Interviews with all levels of the chain of command on 'taking care of soldiers.'

8) Soldier interviews focusing on the 'Keepers of the Peace' themes.

9) Development of 'feature' print products for both command information and commercial (USA Today) newspapers.

c. Execution. Specific taskings and a supporting plan of execution will be provided by separate message.

D. COMMUNITY RELATIONS

1. PURPOSE. To provide guidance for PAOs in the conduct of community relations programs during REFORGER.

2. CONCEPT.

a. Community Relations activities during REFORGER are routinely coordinated by unit G5s.

b. PA and G5 operations complement each other and should be closely coordinated.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. G5s conduct information programs in support of U.S.-host nation relations; briefings, posters, and pamphlets, and other information programs such as the citizens information telephone (tel: 0130-2351).

b. PAOs

1) provide expertise and advice to commanders and G5s to ensure planned activities such as unit equipment displays are in good taste.

2) coordinate for media coverage (PI/CI) as requested by G5s.

E. PLAN COORDINATION.

a. The successful execution of this plan is the responsibility of every member of the USAREUR Team.


b. Command support is essential. PAOs must not be required to operate in a vacuum.

c. Close coordination between PAOs, G3s, and subordinate unit commanders will enable us to:

- 1) Keep our soldiers informed and, in turn,
- 2) Tell the USAREUR story.

CROSBIE E. SAINT
General, USA
Commander in Chief

OFFICIAL:



SAMUEL W. FLOCA, JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief, Public Affairs

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